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Although a process of increasing technocratisation of decision-making was clearly underway during the Frei and even the Allende governments, it was officially ignored because of its negative, elitist implications. In a climate of strong ideological polarisation, the official discourse adopted a populist character, stressing the alleged popular nature and orientation of the power bloc.
Technocrats and Politics in Chile 387

Technocracy and decision-making
The process of the 'technocratisation' of decision-making in Chile has been stimulated by the administrative and overall modernisation experienced by the country during the last 25 years. The 'globalist' character of the developmental goals pursued by the Chilean governments since I964 did serve to strengthen the technocratic orientation of public administration, in the context of a relatively complex society. The expansion of the state apparatus, the application of the land reform, the nationalisation of the copper mines, and the administration of the expropriated enterprises in the period I964-73 set this process into motion. Together with this, the radical and ambitious neoliberal reforms implemented by the military government, together with the increasing complexity and urgency of macro-economic problems (such as the foreign debt) during that period,5 have contributed to the strengthening of the position of highly qualified individuals at top levels within governmental circles.
There are manifold reasons for the underestimation of the role played by technocrats in governmental decision-making in most of the studies on Chilean political development since I964. To begin with, most of the Chilean scholars who have written about social and political issues during this period came themselves from technocratic ranks. They commanded high academic positions within state and private universities. These technocrats also participated in decision-making at governmental level (as tecnicos, advisers, etc.), and enjoyed considerable political power within the political parties (as intellectuals, ideologues or even as members of the central committees).6
As a matter of fact, most scholars prefer to look at society 'as a whole', rather than to look at themselves in the mirror. Just as most painters prefer a landscape to a self-portrait, intellectuals are almost instinctively by which intellectuals think of themselves as 'independent', autonomous, endowed with a character of their own.7 Hence, they prefer not to think that they might constitute a social actor comparable to other social actors such as the military, the entrepreneurs, the peasantry, etc. To recognise their political role in society would lead automatically to an acceptance of the existence of their own interests in both the institutional and the private spheres. It would also imply that they share (together with the other social actors) a portion of the responsibility for events occurring in civil society. As Hirschman has categorically pointed out,
[W]hen a series of disastrous events strikes the body politic, everyone's responsibility must be looked at, including that of the intellectuals... They ought to be more fully aware of their responsibility, which is the greater because of the considerable authority they are apt to wield in their countries. Because of this authority, the process that in the realm of science and technology is known as the protracted sequence from invention to innovation often takes remarkably little time in Latin America with respect to economic, social and political ideas. With social thought turning so rapidly into attempted social engineering, a high incidence of failed experiments is the price that is often paid for the influence intellectuals wield.8
Another factor which has impeded the analysis of the role played by technocrats in national decision-making has been the hyper-ideologisation which characterised Chilean politics during the period 1964-73. The Christian Democratic government stressed the notion of 'popular participation' in its efforts to organise new social actors such as the urban marginals and the peasantry. While the implementation of the 'revolution in liberty' led to an increasing participation of technocrats within the government,9 the attention of government officials was focused on the various socio-economic problems they had to deal with, and not on the technocratic nature of decision-making.
The rhetorical populism of official discourse became even more accentuated during the Popular Unity government.
The authorities defined themselves as the people's government. The middle class origin and the intellectual and technico-professional backgrounds of most of the leading figures (Carlos Altamirano, Luis Maira, Jaime Gazmuri, etc.) were not seen as a governmental asset but rather as a handicap to efforts to The origins of the Chicago boys are directly related to the debate which took place in the late I95os and g96os between structuralists and monetarists on the causes (but especially on the possible solutions) of the developmental problems of Latin America.1 According to the structuralist approach, Latin American governments needed to play a very active role in promoting economic development by adopting a planned policy to generate import-substitution industrialisation. This policy had to be accompanied by protectionism for domestic industry, such as high tariffs for the import of consumer goods, the manipulation of exchange rates, and the adoption of a series of fiscal measures intended to expand the internal market. To back this up, the structuralist recipe stressed the need for land reforms and the redistribution of income to stimulate consumer demand.
The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), led by the Argentine economist Rauil Prebisch, was the most important bastion of structuralist thought in the region.12 From its headquarters in The increasing influence of the Chicago boys within the government and among rightist political organisations and entrepreneurial circles was directly related to their ability to manage the crisis and to produce economic growth. The supporters of the military government also realised that the neoliberals could count on the support of the international financial system. As Kaufman has pointed out, these technocrats, were more than simply the principal architects of economic policy: they were the intellectual brokers between their governments and international capital, and symbols of the government's determination to rationalize its rule primarily in terms of economic objectives ... Cooperation with international business, a fuller integration into the world economy, and a strictly secular willingness to adopt the prevailing tenets of international economic orthodoxy, all formed a...set of intellectual parameters within which the technocrats could then 'pragmatically' pursue the requirements of stabilization and expansion.25 Table 2 Minister with a marked technocratic approach would reach a position that in the past was reserved only for all-round politicos. 49 The CIEPLAN case shows the strategic role that a private research institute can play as a think tank, but especially as a kind of'fitness centre' 
